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 Flood Insurance Coverage in the Coastal Zone 
 
Abstract 
We explore behavior and test theory regarding the determinants of flood insurance 
coverage in the coastal zone using household-level data for nine southeastern counties.  
We use Tobit regression models to assess the importance and magnitude of insurance 
cost, risk factors, community characteristics, and household attributes on flood insurance 
purchase for residential building structures.  Overall estimates indicate price inelastic 
demand, though subsidized policyholders are more sensitive to price and hold greater 
flood insurance coverage (controlling for value of asset at risk).  We find support for 
rational choice in the coastal zone, with flood insurance coverage positively correlated in 
the level of flood risk. We find evidence that coastal erosion risk effects flood insurance 
demand, and that community level erosion hazard mitigation projects influence flood 
insurance holdings, with shoreline armoring appearing to act as a substitute and beach 
replenishment appearing to act as a complement.   
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Flood Insurance Coverage in the Coastal Zone 
Introduction 
Over the past 50 years, coastal areas in the United States have witnessed a growing 
populace, an evolving social environment, and increased economic activity.  On the East 
and Gulf coasts, the burgeoning population faces considerable risk from coastal storms 
(hurricanes and nor’easters) that periodically cause extensive flooding, wind, and erosion 
damage.  Increasing coastal populations, development in hazard-prone areas, rising 
construction costs and increased value at risk have contributed to rising monetary losses 
due to these natural hazards (Kunreuther 1998a; Wharton 2008).  Nordhaus (2006) 
estimates the value of capital stock in low-lying coastal areas vulnerable to natural 
hazards at $1.2 trillion (about 3% of GDP (2005 dollars)), and recent predictions suggest 
that we are entering a period of increased storm activity (Goldenberg et al. 2001; Webster 
et al. 2005) which could exacerbate coastal risk.  
Historically, the catastrophic nature of flood risk and government’s predilection 
for disaster aid has precluded private insurers from voluntarily offering coverage 
(Anderson 1974, Kunreuther 1998b).  Since the late 1960s, the U.S. federal government 
has played an expanded role in providing protection from flood and other coastal hazards.  
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 made federal flood insurance available,1 
through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), to communities that agreed to 
manage development in floodplains, with subsequent legislation (Flood Disaster 
Protection Act of 1973, National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994) designed to 
                                                          
1 The NFIP is actually a cooperative venture of federal, state, and local governments and private insurers.  
The federal government sets flood insurance premiums, stipulates building standards, designates flood 
hazard areas, and authorizes hazard mitigation projects.  State and local governments can augment building 
standards, enforce building codes, and administer some hazard mitigation projects.  Private insurance 
companies sell and service flood insurance policies (Burby 2001). 
augment incentives for insurance purchase and hazard mitigation projects  (Pasterick 
1998).  The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 charged the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with evaluating the effects of coastal erosion 
on coastal communities and the NFIP (Heinz Center 2000).  In light of increasing coastal 
populations and predictions of increasing coastal storm intensity, there is heightened 
concern about natural hazard exposure in coastal areas and the viability of NFIP.  
Understanding household demand for coverage is a key element in assessing the viability 
of the market for flood insurance and the role of market insurance vis-à-vis and in 
conjunction with other forms of indemnification from coastal hazards.   
Due to the large number and diversity of affected communities, delineation of 
flood risk under the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 proved a laborious task, 
leading to the development of the NFIP in phases.  The “Emergency Phase” of the 
program offered insurance at subsidized rates to households in communities that agreed 
to adopt floodplain management ordinances.  Subsidized insurance rates applied only 
until detailed Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) could be produced, after which new 
construction would pay “actuarial” rates determined by location in the flood zone, 
structural characteristics (e.g., elevation), and the existence of community hazard 
mitigation projects (in the “Regular Phase” of the program).2  Construction after the 
publication of FIRMs was required to meet new building standards designed to make 
structures more flood resistant.  As of 1997, 35% of properties in the flood zone 
                                                          
2 There exists skepticism over whether the actuarial NFIP rate schedules accurately reflect expected loss; 
prior to the 2005 hurricane season (a record loss year), the NFIP exhibited a cumulative deficit of $3 billion 
after 37 years of operation (Wharton 2008). 
nationwide were eligible for explicitly subsidized insurance, paying approximately 37% 
of the actuarial premium (Burby 2001).3   
Since its inception, the NFIP has suffered from low levels of participation among 
homeowners.  The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 required communities be 
enrolled in NFIP in order to qualify for certain types of federal disaster assistance and 
required flood insurance purchase for federally-backed (FHA) mortgage loans in high-
risk areas (Pasterick 1998).  Mandatory purchase requirements were strengthened under 
the National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994, and programs were expanded to 
encourage local hazard mitigation projects.  Nonetheless, evidence suggests that 
mandatory purchase requirements are not aggressively enforced after the initial year of a 
mortgage contract (Kunreuther 1996; Palm 1998; Tobin and Calfee 2005), so that after a 
loan is secured participation becomes de facto voluntary.4  In 1997, market penetration 
for the NFIP across the U.S. was estimated at 26% of eligible parcels 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 1999).  Explanations for low market penetration have included 
ignorance of and lack of experience with flood hazard, subjective misperceptions of the 
likelihood of flooding and magnitude of loss, lack of awareness of the availability of 
flood insurance or belief that the price is too high, and “charity hazard” ― a reliance on 
assistance from others (e.g. government) in the event of disaster (Kunreuther 1984, Lewis 
and Nickerson 1989, Kunreuther 1996, Browne and Hoyt 2000). 
In this paper, we focus on flood insurance coverage choice in the coastal zone, 
utilizing household micro-data from 6074 parcels in nine southeastern U.S. counties.  
                                                          
3 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the extent of subsidy has dropped to 25% of policies as of 
2005 (Marron 2006). 
4 Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that enforcement of mandatory purchase provisions has improved.  
For the period over which we have data, however, mandatory purchase provisions were apparently not 
aggressively enforced. 
These data were collected by the H.J. Heinz III Center for Science, Economics, and 
Environment, under the direction of FEMA, pursuant to addressing questions regarding 
the impact of shoreline erosion on coastal communities and the NFIP (Heinz 2000), and 
were utilized by Kriesel and Landry (2004) to examine participation in the NFIP.  We 
expand upon their analysis in a number of ways: i) our empirical model considers not 
only participation, but also the level of coverage elected; ii) we improve upon the 
insurance premium covariate by employing NFIP rate schedules to determine marginal 
price measures that reflect specific property risk attributes (rather than average imputed 
prices as employed in Kriesel and Landry (2004)); and iii) we explore a greater array of 
specifications and covariates in our analysis in order to test economic and behavioral 
determinants of flood insurance coverage.  
Consistent with previous research, we find evidence of price inelastic demand for 
flood insurance.  Price elasticity varies across subsidized and non-subsidized insurance 
policies, with subsidized policyholders exhibiting greater overall coverage (controlling 
for the value of asset at risk) and elastic demand.  Our findings provide support for 
rational choice theory in general, with coverage demand greater in the highest risk (V-
zone) areas and lower in the least risk (B/C/X-zone) areas relative to more moderate risk 
(A-zone) areas (controlling for insurance price and value at risk).   
Coverage is increasing in the erosion rate at the nearest shoreline and higher for 
those households that claim to possess knowledge of the erosion rate at the nearest shoe, 
suggesting that erosion risk may induce flood insurance purchase.5  Further, we find 
evidence that coverage is higher in areas that manage erosion through beach 
                                                          
5 The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 clarified terms under which coastal erosion losses would be 
considered indemnified under flood insurance provisions.  Erosion losses must be associated with flooding 
conditions in order to be covered. 
replenishment and lower in areas that are structurally fortified, suggesting a difference 
between the way households view community protection policies vis-à-vis formal 
insurance (complementary in the case of beach replenishment and as a substitute in the 
case of shoreline armoring).  Results of the extended models suggest that flood insurance 
is a normal good, and demand is increasing in the level of education.  
 
Flood Insurance Coverage: Theory and Empirics 
Optimal insurance coverage has been analyzed within an expected utility (EU) 
maximization framework by Smith (1968) and Mossin (1968).   We briefly sketch a 
simple version of the model in the context of flood insurance.  Let utility U(•) be defined 
over individual wealth, Y = A + L, with A representing endowed wealth and L the value 
of property exposed to risk.  Assume risk aversion: U′(Y) > 0 and U″(Y) < 0.  The 
probability of loss L is π.  The individual may purchase insurance coverage C, providing 
indemnity under the loss scenario, with 0 ≤ C ≤ L.  The insurance premium is 
proportional to C, given by pC.  The individual purchase decision problem is: 
 )()1())1(()]([max pCLAUCpAUYUE
C
−+−+−+== ππ ,  (1) 
where C is the object of optimization.  It is widely recognized that maximization of (1) 
implies full coverage (C = L) if insurance is actuarially fair (p = π) and less than full 
coverage is if the premium includes a loading factor (p = (1+λ)π for 0 < λ < 1).6  
Introducing an exogenous constant deductible to the loss state increases optimal 
coverage, while a piecewise linear pricing schedule will not alter the nature of the 
solution as long as unit price on initial coverage (p1) is less than the unit price of 
                                                          
6 Inclusion of a loading factor in the premium to cover administrative costs is standard practice in private 
insurance markets.  Differential loading factors across policies may also reflect an attempt to alleviate 
adverse selection. 
subsequent coverage (p2); this is the premium structure for the NFIP, with p1 applying to 
initial structure coverage ($0 - $50,000), and p2 applying to additional coverage ($50,000 
- $250,000 [the upper limit on structure coverage]).7   
Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) observe that public perceptions of risk often 
differ from expert objective assessments.  Optimal insurance coverage changes in 
predictable ways if one allows for subjective loss probabilities across individuals that 
differ from objective assessments of insurers; downward bias in subjective risk 
assessment reduces optimal coverage, ceteris paribus, as the insurance will appear too 
expensive.  A number of plausible decision making heuristics give rise to what are 
considered behavioral anomalies in the context of EU and lead to systematic errors in 
optimization; behavioral anomalies include optimism bias (i.e. “it can’t happen to me”), 
desire to reduce anxiety about risk, concerns about the appearance of prudence when 
others learn about one’s decisions, wanting to behave as others (i.e. influence of social 
norms), and a tendency to ignore low probability events (Camerer and Kunreuther 1989; 
McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey 1993; Kunreuther 1996; Palm 1998; Krantz and 
Kunreuther 2007).  Lack of information on probabilities and magnitudes of loss may 
invalidate the EU framework in (1), while saliency of accurate risk information may vary 
over time and by context (Kunreuther, Sanderson, and Vetschera 1985; Krantz and 
Kunreuther 2007).  On the other hand, if full insurance is legally required with strictly 
enforced provisions, insurance coverage may not be an object of discretionary choice.  
Variations in optimal coverage choice can also be explored through the introduction of 
different forms of utility in (1) (e.g. Braun and Muermann 2004; Lee 2007).   Though not 
                                                          
7 As long as p1 < p2, the kinked budget constraint still produces a convex set of consumption possibilities 
over which the consumer chooses.  Optimization will produce a unique solution, though the first-order 
conditions may not hold with equality at the kink-point. 
explicitly considered in model (1), the likelihood and expected magnitude of disaster 
assistance may affect the demand for flood insurance. 
There exists little empirical work on flood insurance coverage.  Baumann and 
Sims (1978) find evidence that past experience with disasters motivates insurance 
adoption, as do social class and personality.8  Survey research suggests that lower income 
and non-white households, women, and elderly all tend to exhibit greater fear of 
disasters, though it is unclear whether this fear translates into insurance purchase or other 
types of mitigation and protective behavior (Palm 1998).  Brown and Hoyt (2000) use 
state level panel data to estimate a flood insurance demand model.  They find a negative 
price effect (inelastic in a market penetration model and approximately unitary in a 
coverage level model) and positive income effect on flood insurance demand.  Consistent 
with previous findings, their results suggest that demand is increasing in flood damages 
of the prior year.  Contrary to expectations, they find that insurance demand is decreasing 
in the number of federally-backed (FHA) mortgages and increasing in the amount of 
federal disaster assistance.   
National data gathered by Dixon et al. (2006) support the finding that market 
penetration rates are not sensitive to price, and further suggest that penetration is 
significantly higher in special flood hazard areas (SFHA — also known as A-zone)9 and 
higher for communities with a larger number of parcels in the SFHA.  The authors 
attribute the latter finding to more aggressive marketing of and more familiarity with 
flood insurance on the part of insurers in such communities.  Dixon et al. (2006) find that 
                                                          
8 Baumann and Sims find that the internal-external locus of control is significantly related to insurance 
adoption, with those who feel that they are in control of their destinies are more likely to hold insurance 
than those he feel their lives to be directed by external forces. 
9 The SFHA is the flood zone that exhibits a 1 percent chance of flooding each year. 
the probability of purchasing insurance is substantially higher in communities subject to 
coastal flooding than in communities that are not―63 percent versus 35 percent.  They 
speculate that demand for flood insurance may be lower in communities not subject to 
coastal flooding because there is less appreciation for flood risk or because the type of 
coverage offered by flood insurance policies is less attractive in inland areas.   
Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2008) examine county-level panel data and 
individual-level policy data to explore characteristics of the flood insurance market in 
Florida (which represents approximately 40% of policies in force and total dollars of 
coverage).  They find that the overwhelming majority of policyholders elect the lowest 
level of deductible ($500), and that coverage levels have increased in reaction to the 
floods of 2004, while deductibles have decreased.  For most policyholders, the $250,000 
limit on structure coverage is not binding, as their replacement value is less than this 
limit.  Further, they find that Florida’s average flood insurance premium is the lowest in 
the nation, and surprisingly, the average Florida premium level has decreased in the most 
recent year of their data. 
Kriesel and Landry (2004) use household level data from the coastal zone to 
examine participation in NFIP.  They find price inelastic demand for flood insurance and 
a positive income effect.  Consistent with NFIP requirements their results suggest that 
mortgaged properties are much more likely to be covered by flood insurance.  Further 
they find that insurance participation is higher in coastal areas that are fortified with 
artificial erosion protection (shoreline armoring and/or beach replenishment), lower for 
properties located further back from the shoreline, and lower for geographical areas that 
have a higher hurricane return period (lower hurricane risk).   
We expand upon the analysis of Kriesel and Landry by considering both 
participation and coverage level in our empirical model, employing different measures of 
flood insurance premiums, and explore a greater array of specifications and covariates in 
our analysis in order to test economic and behavioral determinants of flood insurance 
coverage.  Our approach is more similar to the analysis of Guiso and Jappelli (1998), 
which examines casualty insurance in Italy and how coverage is influenced by 
uninsurable household wealth risk and other factors. 
 
Flood Insurance Coverage Data 
We make use of flood insurance coverage data studied by Kriesel and Landry (2004), but 
append a complement of information in order to conduct additional analysis.  These data 
were gathered by the H.J. Heinz III Center for Science, Economics, and the Environment, 
under the direction of FEMA, to address issues of flood insurance and coastal erosion.  
The sampling frame is residential parcels in the near-shore zone10 of nine coastal counties 
in Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Texas.  A stratified 
random sample of the near-shore zone was selected across the nine counties using a T-
shaped sampling frame within each county in order to ensure adequate coverage on the 
oceanfront; weights are used to adjust all reported statistics for representation of the near-
shore zone.   
Table 1 displays a breakdown of the 6074 parcels that were selected for the study.  
Galveston County, Texas and Dare County, North Carolina provide the most 
observations (18.5% and 17.6% of the sample, respectively), while Lee County, Florida 
                                                          
10 For the purposes of this study, the near-shore zone is defined as parcels within approximately 1000 feet 
of the ocean. 
and Glynn County, Georgia provide the fewest (7.5% and 5.4% of the sample, 
respectively).  For each parcel, contractors made onsite visits to collect information, such 
as structure elevation above base flood elevation (BFE), foundation type, presence of 
basement or other obstruction below the main floor, ocean frontage, etc.  Geographic 
information systems were employed to estimate distance from the shoreline, distance 
from the central business district, flood zone, and historical erosion rate.  Parcel and 
structure characteristics from the county tax assessor’s database were appended to the 
onsite data.11  The sample was then merged by address with the Federal Insurance 
Administration’s policies-in-force database in order to provide accurate information on 
market penetration and coverage levels.  Of the 6074 parcels with complete data, 52 
percent of property owners were identified as holders of flood insurance.  Lastly, the 
dataset was complemented with information from a survey questionnaire sent to the home 
address of all parcel owners in the sample during 1998.  The response rates, indicated in 
the last column of table 1, vary significantly across counties, with a high of 53% in Dare 
County, North Carolina and a low of 19% in Sussex County, Delaware.  The overall 
survey response rate was 34%.    
  Table 2 reports weighted descriptive statistics on insurance, parcel, and structure 
characteristics for the entire sample.  The average flood insurance coverage for structure 
in the sample (obtained from both policies-in-force data and mail survey) was $71,600 
($1998), with a minimum of zero and a maximum of $250,000.12  Average coverage for 
NFIP participants was $142,431.  The next two rows of table 2 indicate measures of 
marginal flood insurance premium expressed in dollars per $100 coverage.  Marginal 
                                                          
11 Details of the data collection effort are available in Heinz Center (2000). 
12 Almost 50% of the respondents in our dataset hold no flood insurance, while consistent with the findings 
of Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2008) only 7.5% elect for the maximum coverage of $250,000. 
premiums were calculated using descriptive information on the property and detailed 
NFIP rate tables from 2004 (adjusted back to 1998 levels).13  At the parcel level, flood 
insurance premiums depend upon a number of factors, including: flood zone, year of 
construction relative to publication of FIRM, presence of basement or obstruction below 
a property, type of structure, elevation above BFE, Community Ratings System (CRS) 
score, the level of coverage, and chosen deductible.14  We discuss each of these factors in 
turn. 
Most of the properties in our data (50%) are located in the V flood zone, 100-year 
flood zone with additional risk due to high-velocity waves associated with storm surge.  
Forty-one percent are located in the standard SFHA or A-zone (100-year flood zone), and 
9% are located in the B/C/X-zones (500-year flood or lower risk zones).  Houses built 
before the publication of FIRMs in their community and those in the V-zone built 
between 1975 and 198115 are “grandfathered” in the NFIP and pay explicitly subsidized 
insurance rates.  Fifty-seven percent of the parcels in our dataset qualified for subsidized 
insurance under these guidelines.  Subsidized and regular flood insurance premiums vary 
by flood zone, with structures in the V-zone paying the highest rates and structures in the 
X-zone paying the lowest rates.  Subsidized rates vary according to whether a basement 
or other obstruction is present and by type of structure (single or multiple-family).  
Regular rates vary by number of building stories, presence of basement or obstruction, 
structure type, and elevation above BFE.  Post-FIRM structures with greater elevation 
                                                          
13 Flood insurance rates have been generally increasing over time.  Between 1998 and 2004 there were 
three targeted rate increases that we had to factor into our marginal premium calculations. 
14 Total premium also includes a $30 Federal Policy Fee that applies to high-risk areas, an Increased Cost 
of Compliance coverage premium, and a Probation Surcharge (if applicable).  These additional fees do not 
affect the marginal premium, but may induce price differences on the extensive margin.  
15 Post-FIRM structures in the V-zone built between 1975 and 1981 are “grandfathered’ because building 
standards did not take account of damage due to wave heights. The level of the subsidy is different for pre-
FIRM structures and these “grandfathered” V-zone structures. 
pay lower rates.  Almost 70% of structures in our dataset are elevated on piles, and 18% 
have obstructions below the property.  Average elevation above base flood elevation 
(BFE - height of the 100-year flood) was 3.3 feet, with a high of 30 feet and a low of -
12.5 feet (that is 12.5 feet below BFE).   
The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 established the Community 
Rating System (CRS) to evaluate and summarize mitigation projects in a community.  
The CRS score ranges from 1 (many mitigation projects, low flood risk) to 10 (little or no 
mitigation projects, baseline flood risk); a lower CRS score decreases flood insurance 
premiums.  The average CRS score for our sample was 8.3 with a low of 5 and a high of 
10.  All premiums are adjusted to reflect the CRS score for the community, with 
discounts ranging from 0% (for a score of 10) to 25% (for a score of 5).   
Premiums also vary by amount of coverage.  A basic lower rate applies to the first 
$50,000 of coverage on structure, while a higher rate applies to additional coverage up to 
the $250,000 limit on structure.16 Knowing coverage level, we are able to apply the 
marginal rate in our empirical analysis.  The marginal rate should affect decision making 
via the theoretical model in (1).  Previous research (Kriesel and Landry 2004) has 
employed an estimate of the average insurance rate. 
The standard deductible for NFIP structure coverage is $500.  Reduced premiums 
are awarded for those opting for a higher deductible, up to $5,000 deductible on single-
family structures.  Premiums for post-FIRM structures in the V-zone built after 1981 
(approximately 14% of our data) depend upon the ratio of coverage level to replacement 
value (‘replacement cost ratio’).  Unfortunately, our data contain limited information (N 
                                                          
16 Basic contents coverage rates apply to the first $20,000 in insurance, with higher rates applying to 
additional coverage up to the $100,000 limit on contents.  We do not consider contents coverage in this 
paper. 
= 1668 for policy holders) on deductible level17 and no information on replacement 
value.18  To make full use of the available data, we consider two measures of marginal 
premium ― a high and a low version ― in order to assess the responsiveness of coverage 
demand to premium level.  The high premium model assumes all households elect the 
standard $500 deductible and that post-FIRM structures in the V-zone built after 1981 
select a level of coverage that is less than 50% of the structure replacement cost.  The 
data of Michel-Kerjan and Kousky (2008) suggest that 98% of Florida policyholders 
select a deductible less than the maximum and 80% choose the lowest deductible of 
$500.  Thus, the high premium assumptions probably provide the most accurate results.  
The average high marginal premium is $1.01 per $100 coverage with a minimum of 
$0.06 and a maximum of $6.00.  The price elasticity from the coverage model that 
employs the high marginal premium will be a lower bound on the true value.  The low 
premium model assumes all households elect a $1000 deductible and that post-FIRM 
structures in the V-zone built after 1981 select a level of coverage that is greater than or 
equal to 75% of the replacement cost.  The average low marginal premium is $0.87 per 
$100 coverage with a minimum of $0.06 and a maximum of $3.90.  The price elasticity 
from the coverage model that employs the low marginal premium will be an upper bound 
on the true value. 
The average historical beach erosion rate is 2.7 feet per year for those properties 
in an actively eroding zone (71% of the sample).  A much smaller proportion (6.5%) or 
parcels are in accreting zones, with an average accretion rate of 0.2 feet per year.  The 
remaining 22.5% of parcels are classified as being in neither an erosion or accretion 
                                                          
17 Of these data, 50% claim structure deductible of $500 and 80% claim deductible of $1000 or less.   
18 Building assessed values are often outdated and housing sales prices reflect both structure and land 
values. 
zone.19 Kriesel, Randall and Lichtkoppler (1993) use a variable transformation, geotime, 
to measure erosive pressure on a parcel.  Geotime is defined as the ratio of setback (or 
distance from the shoreline) to historical erosion rate, providing an estimate of the 
number of years a parcel is expected to remain in the face of constant, deterministic 
shoreline erosion.  Average geotime in our sample is 787 years, but approximately 30% 
of the parcels exhibited geotime less than 10 years.  The hurricane return period, the 
mean number of years expected to elapse between landfall of major hurricanes in an area, 
was calculated at the county level from summary information provided by FEMA.  The 
average is 47 years, with a low of 16 years and a high of 190 years.  The average distance 
from the shore is 318 feet and 42% of properties are oceanfront.   
 The tax assessor’s database provides information on assessed building and land 
values, recent sales price, year of construction, year of sale, and other structural variables.  
Building and land assessed values are unreliable measures of value for our analysis due to 
differences in assessment and updating across municipalities.  Since information on sales 
price is limited (N = 2844), we employ hedonic price regression to produce imputed 
current property values.20  The average property sales price is $187,177 (1997$), and the 
average predicted asset value is $143,683.  The average ratio of flood insurance coverage 
to estimated asset value is 0.651.  Year of construction is used to determine whether the 
structure was built after the publication of a FIRM in the community.  Post-FIRM 
buildings are required to meet more stringent building standards and pay ‘actuarial’ flood 
insurance rates.   
                                                          
19 The erosion rates were calculated by state coastal zone managers.  In some cases, managers set the 
erosion rate to zero if structural fortification (i.e. seawalls) were in place. 
20 The hedonic price regression results are presented in table 4.  The estimated model is used to impute 
housing sales price in 1997. 
We turn next to survey data gathered from the mail questionnaire.  The 
descriptive statistics are weighted for non-response bias of NFIP non-participants (in 
addition to the T-shaped sampling frame) and are presented in table 3.  Household 
income is measured by a nominal response to 8 income categories, with the mid-point 
utilized as an estimate.  The average income is over $100,000.  Twenty percent of 
respondents have high school as the highest level of educational attainment; 43% are 
college graduates, and 36% have at least some graduate school training. Forty-five 
percent are retired, and 5% work part-time.  The average age is 61 years, and the average 
household has 0.46 children.   
Sixty-eight percent of respondents indicated that they would have purchased their 
coastal home regardless of whether flood insurance was available, and 11% indicate that 
they have allowed their flood insurance to lapse at some time in the past.  Ten percent 
indicate that they have submitted an insurance claim for flood damages in the past.  
Thirty-nine percent identify their property as mortgaged, but surprising only 15% claim 
that they were required to purchase flood insurance by their mortgage lender.  Only 28% 
of respondents claimed to be aware of the erosion rate at the nearest shore.  Nineteen 
percent indicated that shoreline armoring was being used to combat erosion at the 
shoreline nearest their property, while 35% indicated that beach replenishment was being 
utilized at the nearest shoreline. The majority of respondents (35%) utilize their property 
as a vacation home.  Thirty percent use the property as part-time rental and part-time 
vacation home.  Almost a quarter utilize the property as their primary residence, and 10% 
offer the property as a full-time rental. 
A subset of respondents (N = 292) provided information regarding why they did 
not hold flood insurance.  The majority (30%) indicated that flood insurance was too 
expensive.  A quarter indicated that they perceived the risk of flooding as very low, while 
20% claimed they were not required to purchase flood insurance.  Nine percent indicated 
that flood insurance was unavailable.   
 
Econometric Models of Flood Insurance Coverage 
We employ multiple regression analysis to explore determinants of flood insurance 
coverage choice for residential building structures in the near-shore coastal zone.  We 
consider two models, one of coverage level with imputed asset value included as a 
covariate (referred to as the ‘coverage’ model), and the other of the ratio of coverage 
level to imputed asset value (referred to as the ‘ratio’ model).  Flood insurance coverage 
is a censored variable because it cannot be below $0 (and for the coverage model, it 
cannot exceed the $250,000 upper limit).  We use the Tobit model (Tobin 1958, 
Wooldridge 2001), which assumes that the continuous portion of the error distribution is 
reasonably approximated by a Gaussian probability density, while the censored values are 
represented by cumulative Gaussian probability masses.  Due to the use of an imputed 
regressor in the coverage model, we use bootstrapping to obtain reliable standard errors. 
Let yi be the amount of flood insurance coverage elected, or the ratio of coverage 
to asset value.  The dependent variable for a Tobit model can be censored as follows: 
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where yi is the observed response variable (coverage level or ratio of coverage to asset 
value), is the latent response variable, UL is the upper limit on coverage ($250,000) 
and LL is the lower limit ($0).  The upper limit applies only to the coverage model.  The 
log-likelihood function for the Tobit model is:  
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for the ratio model, where )(•φ  represents the standard normal probability density 
function, represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function, x is a 
vector of covariates hypothesized to effect demand for flood insurance coverage, and β 
and σ parameters to be estimated.   
)(•Φ
Economic theory provides guidance on the specification of covariates for our 
regression models (Smith 1969, Mossin 1969).  The marginal price of flood insurance 
(i.e. the amount charged for additional $100 coverage) is a primary parameter in the 
specification of demand, as is household income.  Risk factors, such as presence in a 
flood zone, should affect demand; we hypothesize that households in higher risk zones 
will demand greater coverage, but the higher cost of insurance in these zones makes the 
effect uncertain.  We also explore erosion hazard factors, such as the erosion/accretion 
rate and the presence of erosion mitigation projects (shoreline armoring or beach 
replenishment) in the nearby area.  Households may view such projects as substitutes or 
complements to formal flood insurance depending upon their own assessment of the 
protection offered.  Other covariates in the model include property usage and household 
demographic factors. 
Theory and intuition suggest that the value of the asset at risk should affect 
insurance demand.  Unfortunately, we have limited information on property replacement 
values.  We employ hedonic price regression analysis to produce imputed current 
property values, and take a proportion of the imputed value as an estimate of the 
replacement value of the structure at risk.  The hedonic price regression parameters for 
the entire sample are displayed in table 4.  The estimation utilizes a semi-log functional 
form and includes housing sales between 1980 and 1997.  Due to missing data, the 
specification is fairly restrictive, including only square footage and lot size (both in 
quadratic form), dummy variables for missing information on square footage or lot size, 
the age of the structure at time of sale, dummy variables for oceanfront and vacant lots at 
time of sale, and distance to the central business district (CBD).  Year fixed effects are 
included for 1980 - 1996.21  The estimated model is used to impute housing sales price in 
1997, and 60% of the estimated sales price provides a proxy for the structure asset 
value.22  
Method of estimation is quasi-maximum likelihood, as weights (ωi) are applied to 
each observation of the log-likelihood function to correct for the T-shaped sampling 
frame (and under-representation of flood insurance non-participants in the case of models 
3 and 4).  A modified Newton-Raphson algorithm is used to obtain parameter estimates 
(Amemiya 1973, 1985).  Marginal effects are transformations of (3) and (3’) that provide 
                                                          
21 The R2 indicates that the included covariates explain 51% of the variation in log of housing sales prices, 
and the F-statistic for the model is statistically significant at the 1% level.    All parameters have the 
expected sign and all are statistically significant at the 5% level for a Type I error, except for missing lot 
size, and Glynn County and Sussex County dummy variables. 
22 Sixty percent is the average value of the ratio of building assessed value to total assessed value in our 
dataset. 
an estimate of the effect that a unit change in an element of the vector x have upon the 
response variable (insurance coverage in raw or ratio form).  Marginal effects for the 
double-censored Tobit (coverage) model are calculated as: 
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for each continuous element j of the vector x, where E(•) is the expectations operator.  
Marginal effects for the single-censored Tobit (ratio) model are calculated as: 
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 Marginal effects for discrete covariates in both models are calculated as: 
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Elasticities transform marginal effects into unit-free, percentage change effects, and are 
calculated as: 
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where x and y are weighted means of the independent and response variables, 
respectively, and the latter discrete measure effect is a half-elasticity. 
We are concerned about the possible introduction of bias in estimation of 
parameters of coverage models (3) due to the presence of an imputed regressor ― 
housing asset value.  Such imputed regressors by construction suffer from sampling error.  
These errors introduce bias into hypothesis tests based on covariance matrices inferred 
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from regressions which include imputed regressors.  These biases are persistent and do 
not disappear in large samples; to obtain reliable and unbiased results, the imputed 
regressor problem must be addressed.  Murphy and Topel (1985) propose a solution to 
the imputed (or ‘generated’) regressor problem, but their results focus on linear models 
and are not easily extended to non-linear models, such as Tobit.  We, thus, employ a 
bootstrapping procedure (Efron and Tibshirani 1986) to estimate the standard errors for 
the coverage models.24  With each resampled dataset, we estimate both the first stage 
imputation (i.e. hedonic price) equation and the second stage Tobit model (Shao and 
Sitter 1996).  We repeat this procedure 2000 times, and calculate standard errors from the 
distribution of estimated coefficients.   
 
Results 
We report bootstrapped coefficients and standard errors for the Tobit coverage (3) model 
in tables 5 and 6, employing high and low estimate of marginal insurance premium, 
respectively.  Each table includes 4 models, the first of which serves as a baseline and 
includes marginal premium, indicators for the V and B/C/X flood zones, imputed asset 
value, the hurricane return interval, and the historical average erosion rate (er) or 
accretion rate (ar).  Model 2 explores differences in coverage for subsidized 
policyholders, while models 3 and 4 utilize survey data to explore the influence of local 
hazard mitigation projects and household level variables, respectively.  An asterisk 
indicates covariates which are not statistically significant at the 5% level for a Type I 
                                                          
24 The ratio model does not utilize a bootstrap because the imputed regressor is in the denominator of the 
dependent variable. 
error.  As models 1 and 2 utilize the full dataset, we deem these estimates more reliable 
for covariates that are included in all models.   
All coverage model specifications exhibit a negative flood insurance price 
coefficient.  Our estimates of price elasticity of demand are εp = -0.308 for the high 
premium model and εp = -0.745 for the low premium model.  Thus, both models indicate 
inelastic demand, with the high premium providing an arguably better estimate and a 
lower bound on the responsiveness of flood insurance demand to price.  Models 2 explore 
the variability in coverage by subsidy class.  Subsidized policyholders are much more 
price sensitive than non-subsidized, εp = -1.092 compared to εp = -0.330, respectively for 
the high premium model (εp = -1.697 compared to εp = -0.366 for the low).  Surprisingly, 
these results also indicate that those households that face subsidized rates purchase less 
flood insurance (marginal effect = -$44,100 (-$52,448) for the high (low) premium 
model).     
All coverage models indicate significantly higher insurance coverage in the V-
zone and lower insurance coverage in the B/C/X-zones relative to the A-zone.  For 
example, results from model 1, table 5 suggest that location within the V-zone increases 
flood insurance coverage by $50,802, all else being equal, while location in the B/C/X-
zone decreases flood insurance coverage by $38,248.  Of the models that utilize the full 
dataset, the estimated marginal effect for V-zone ranges from $50,802 to $79,545; the 
estimated marginal effect for X-zone ranges from -$38,248 to -$53,833.  Estimated asset 
value is statistically insignificant in all specifications, except for the fourth model (which 
focuses on the sub-sample of survey respondents).  Results from these models suggest 
that a 1% increase in asset value increases flood insurance coverage by between 0.32% 
and 0.35%.  The effect of hurricane return period is consistently negative in all coverage 
models except one (in which it is statistically insignificant), suggesting that lower 
hurricane risk is associated with lower flood insurance coverage.  The estimated effect 
ranges from -$2700 to -$3900 for a one-year increase in the return interval.   
 Results from models 1 suggest that those households facing higher erosion hazard 
demand greater flood insurance coverage, with a marginal effect of around $3400 for one 
foot increase in the erosion rate in each specification, though this effect is insignificant in 
models 2.  The rate of shoreline accretion has no statistically significant effect on flood 
insurance demand.  According to the results in models 3, community hazard mitigation 
projects do not affect demand for flood insurance coverage.  Models 4 explore the effect 
of household-level factors on the demand for flood insurance.  The income elasticity in 
both models is around εI = 0.57, indicating flood insurance is a normal good.  Those with 
a mortgage hold much higher flood insurance coverage, with a marginal effect of $84,832 
($78,069) in the high (low) premium model.  Lastly, those with high school as their 
highest level of educational attainment hold less flood insurance that those with graduate 
level training (marginal effect around -$70,000). 
We turn next to the ratio models in tables 7 and 8, displaying parameter estimates 
for the ratio of flood insurance coverage to estimated asset value using a single-censored 
Tobit model (equation 3’).  Again we find evidence of inelastic demand, on average, with 
εp = -0.579 as a lower bound on responsiveness and εp = -0.826 as an upper bound.  In 
accord with the coverage models, subsidized policyholders exhibit elastic demand (εp = -
1.743 as a lower bound and εp = -2.459 as an upper bound), while non-subsidized 
policyholders exhibit very low elasticity (εp = -0.105 as a lower bound and εp = -0.249 as 
an upper bound).  In contrast to the coverage models, subsidized policyholders exhibit 
greater demand flood insurance when the dependent variable is expressed as a ratio 
(marginal effect ranging from $0.333 - $0.379 per $1 asset value). 
We find presence in the V flood-zone increases flood insurance coverage relative 
to the A-zone.  The marginal effect is $0.38 (between $0.44 and $0.57) per dollar of asset 
value for the high (low) flood insurance premium models.  Presence in lower flood risk 
zones (B/C/X), on the other hand, diminishes flood insurance coverage by $0.12 - $0.19 
per dollar of asset value (across both models).  Flood insurance coverage is higher in 
locations with higher erosion, though the effect is somewhat small ― $0.03 - $0.05 per 
dollar asset value for each foot increase in the erosion rate.  The coefficient for hurricane 
return interval has an unexpected positive sign in the ratio models, possibly reflecting the 
poor nature of this proxy for hurricane risk. 
In contrast to the coverage models, flood insurance holdings are greater in 
locations that manage coastal erosion through beach replenishment and lower in locations 
that employ coastal armoring when demand is expressed as a ratio.  Marginal effects for 
both models indicate around $0.28 higher coverage per $1 asset value in communities 
that employ beach replenishment and approximately $0.14 lower coverage per $1 asset 
value in communities that utilize shoreline armoring.  Results of model 4 lend further 
support to the suggestion that mortgage status has a large impact on insurance coverage 
(marginal effect ranging from $0.36 to $0.39 per $1 asset value).  The income elasticity is 
around 0.2 for both specifications.  Flood insurance demand is lower for those with high 
school as highest educational attainment (relative to those with graduate training). 
 
Discussion 
Consistent with previous research, we find inelastic demand for flood insurance (U.S. 
GAO 1983; Browne and Hoyt 2000; Kriesel and Landry 2004; Dixon et al. 2006).  We 
believe that our estimates may be more accurate than previous estimates due to the fact 
that we employ marginal measures of insurance premium and utilize household-level 
micro data.  Our results, however, are limited to coastal properties in the southeast.  Due 
to the lack of information on deductible and replacement value, we estimate dual models 
employing a high and low estimate of marginal premium for all specifications.  Despite 
this limitation our price elasticity estimates are rather tight; the overall estimate ranges 
from -0.308 to -0.745.  Estimates that employ the ratio of coverage to estimated asset 
value also find evidence of inelastic demand, with εp ranging from -0.579 to -0.826. In 
both cases, the former estimate is arguably better due to underlying assumptions. 
 Our results also provide some insight into the differences in coverage and 
elasticity across subsidized and non-subsidized flood insurance policies.  We find greater 
price elasticity of demand for subsidized policyholders in both the coverage and ratio 
specifications, ranging from -1.092 to -1.697 for the coverage models and from -1.743 to 
-2.459 for the ratio models.  In all models, price elasticity of demand for non-subsidized 
policyholders is very low, ranging from -0.084 to -0.15 for the coverage models and from 
-0.105 to -0.249 for the ratio models.  In terms of raw coverage, subsidized policyholders 
demand less coverage (ranging from -$44,100 to -$52,448) than non-subsidized 
policyholders.  When we examine demand as a ratio of coverage to asset value, however, 
subsidized policyholder demand greater coverage (ranging from $0.333 to $0.379 per $1 
asset value) than non-subsidized policyholders.  These results probably reflect the lower 
market value of subsidized parcels, which should be older and more vulnerable to hazards 
(since they were constructed before flood mitigation building standards were in force). 
The Congressional Budget Office (Marron 2006) estimates that flood insurance 
premium payments make up about 60% of the actuarial balance, leaving the general 
taxpayer responsible for an estimated $1.3 billion per year.  Our results support the 
contention that moderate increases in flood insurance premiums will probably not induce 
wholesale cancellation of policies, but the reduction in demand is likely to be 
significantly greater for subsidized than non-subsidized policyholders.  To the extent that 
mortgage requirements mandate a specified level of flood insurance coverage, price 
increases will have little effect on demand but will clearly induce negative welfare effects 
on coastal households (assuming that the quality of post-disaster payouts and assistance 
remains constant).25    Holding of a property mortgage induces the largest positive 
marginal effects in our models ― on the order of $78,000 - $85,000 in the coverage 
model and ranging from $0.36 - $0.39 per $1 asset value for the ratio model.   
The efficacy of the mortgage requirement provision, however, has limits.  The 
raw data suggest that in 1998 only 39% of coastal properties were mortgaged.  This likely 
reflects a high level of wealth for many coastal property owners.  The low proportion of 
mortgages limits the influence of mandatory purchase provisions tied to mortgage status.  
Moreover only 15% claim that they are required to hold flood insurance despite the 
federal mandate for FDIC-backed mortgages.  The raw data suggest that 11% of 
respondents have allowed their flood insurance coverage to lapse as some time in the 
past.  This result is consistent with the suggestion that lenders have not been especially 
                                                          
25 The reduction in public funds for flood-related payouts will induce countervailing welfare increases for 
the general populace (assuming that the savings in public expenditures are utilized for other programs that 
people value or rebated to tax payers in tax cuts). 
zealous in enforcing insurance purchase requirements as required by law (Kunreuther 
1984; Kunreuther 1996; Pasterick 1998), but anecdotal evidence suggests that more 
recent data may not show a similar tendency.26  The subset of survey data providing 
information on why those that have foregone flood insurance have made such a choice 
indicates that subjective assessments of flooding tend to be lower than objective 
estimates, as 55% of respondents claim that the price of insurance is too high or that the 
risk of flooding is very low. 
Our results provide some support for rational decision making with regard to 
flood risk in the coastal zone.  We find evidence of significantly higher insurance 
coverage in the V-zone (ranging from $50,800 to $79,500 in the coverage models and 
from $0.33 to $0.44 per $1 asset vale in the ratio models) and lower insurance coverage 
in the X-zone (ranging from -$38,200 to -$53,800 in the coverage models and from -
$0.12 to -$0.19 per $1 asset vale in the ratio models) relative to the A-zone.  This pattern 
of results suggests that, conditional on the price of flood insurance and the value of the 
asset at risk, homeowners anticipate higher damage and thus purchase greater coverage in 
the 100-year flood zone with high velocity waves relative to the standard 100-year flood 
zone, and that anticipation of damage and purchase of insurance coverage is lower in 
flood zones with less risk.  From the coverage models, we find flood insurance demand is 
increasing in the estimated value of the asset at risk, but the effect is statistically 
insignificant in most models (save for models 4, for which the estimated marginal effect 
is between $100 and $200 dollars of coverage for a $1000 increase in asset value).  Flood 
                                                          
26 Also, in auxiliary regressions (results available upon request) we find evidence that new homeowners are 
no more likely to hold greater flood insurance coverage than other households in the coastal zone — a 
result counter to what we might expect if homeowners enroll in the flood insurance program at the time of 
house purchase to satisfy mortgage lender requirements, but subsequently let their coverage lapse. 
insurance demand is increasing in hurricane risk, as reflected in the hurricane return 
interval, for the coverage models.  The marginal effect is between $2700 and $3900 for a 
one year decrease in the hurricane return interval.  This covariate, however, has a 
counter-intuitive positive parameter in the ratio models.  Thus, the result is not robust 
across specifications. 
We employ housing use data to test for wealth effects on flood insurance demand.  
Our data include information on those households that use their coastal property as a 
vacation home, as their primary residence, or as a rental unit.  The rental market for 
housing in coastal areas is typically very active.  Those households that own multiple 
homes (at least one in the coastal zone) and choose to forego rental income on their 
coastal property are likely wealthier than those that supply in the rental market or those 
for whom the coastal property is their primary residence.  Neither the vacation home 
dummy variable nor the primary residence dummy variable, however, proves to have any 
explanatory power in our regression models.  Thus, our findings are not particularly 
insightful regarding wealth, and this remains a difficult topic to explore empirically.  
Consistent with previous research (Browne and Hoyt 2000; Kriesel and Landry 2004) we 
find a positive and statistically significant income elasticity in each model, around εI = 
0.57 for the coverage model and εI = 0.22 for the ratio model. 
The FEMA project that these data were collected for sought to explore the effect 
of coastal erosion on the NFIP.  The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 made explicit 
the terms under which damages due to coastal erosion would be indemnified under flood 
insurance provisions.  In particular, erosion losses must be associated with flooding 
conditions in order to be covered by flood insurance.  It is unclear, however, to what 
extent erosion risk affects expected loss and flood insurance demand.  The data provide 
some insight regarding the latter.  We find that households facing higher erosion hazard 
demand greater flood insurance coverage.  The estimated marginal effects are on the 
order of roughly $3300 per one foot increase in the annual historical erosion rate in the 
coverage model (though the effect is statistically insignificant in model 2), and between 
$0.03 and $0.05 per $1 asset value for each one foot increase in the erosion rate in the 
ratio model.  These results suggest that some homeowners view flood insurance as a form 
of partial indemnification from erosion hazard.  Moreover, those claiming knowledge of 
the erosion rate at the nearest shore hold more flood insurance (around $0.06 per $1 asset 
value) in the ratio model, while the effect of this covariate is statistically insignificant in 
the coverage model.  This result could point to an insurance demand effect that erosion 
information has on coastal property owners, but, on the other hand, may simply reflect 
correlation across insurance purchase and information attainment that reflects common 
unobserved heterogeneity at the household level (i.e. risk-aversion). 
Lastly, consistent with the findings of Kriesel and Landry (2004), we find some 
evidence that community level erosion hazard mitigation projects influence flood 
insurance holdings, but the effect is not consistently significant across model 
specifications.  Statistical significance is found only in the ratio models.  For these 
models, in contrast to the results of Kriesel and Landry, we find asymmetry across the 
type of project, with shoreline armoring appearing to act as a substitute for flood 
insurance (reducing coverage by around $0.15 per $1 asset value) and beach 
replenishment appearing to act as a complement (increasing coverage by around $0.28 
per $1 asset value).  This distinction is important as communities often apply for credit 
within the context of the Community Ratings System for hazard mitigation projects in 
order to reduce their flood insurance premiums.  The NFIP may be more inclined to 
recognize and award credit for projects that are seen as complementary to flood insurance 
holdings. 
    
Conclusions 
We use Tobit regression models to explore behavior and test theory regarding the 
determinants of flood insurance coverage in the coastal zone using micro-level data for 
nine southeastern U.S. counties.  Unlike previous research, we incorporate both the 
extensive and intensive margin of demand and employ measures of marginal insurance 
premium to assess price elasticity.  Overall estimates indicate price inelastic demand, 
though subsidized policyholders are more sensitive to price and hold greater flood 
insurance coverage (controlling for value of asset at risk).   
We find support for rational choice in the coastal zone, with flood insurance 
coverage correlated in the level of flood risk, controlling for insurance price and value of 
the threatened asset.  In one set of models, flood insurance demand is increasing in 
hurricane risk, as reflected in the hurricane return interval, but this result is not robust 
across specifications.  The other set of models provide counter-intuitive results with 
regard to hurricane risk, likely reflecting error in this county-level proxy for hurricane 
risk.  We attempt to proxy for household wealth, using dummy variable that reflect how 
the owner uses the property, but results are statistically insignificant.  We find a positive 
and statistically significant income elasticity that is less than one indicating the flood 
insurance is a normal good. 
We find evidence that erosion risk does affect flood insurance demand, as 
households facing higher erosion hazard demand greater insurance coverage and those 
that claim knowledge of the erosion rate at the nearest shore hold more flood insurance.  
Lastly, we find some evidence that community level erosion hazard mitigation projects 
influence flood insurance holdings, with shoreline armoring appearing to act as a 
substitute and beach replenishment appearing to act as a complement for flood insurance 
in our ratio models.  Unfortunately, we are unable to address the importance of “charity 
hazard”, or a reliance on third-party assistance in the event of natural disaster.  Finding 
data that will allow for an assessment of charity hazard vis-à-vis other determinants of 
flood insurance demand remains an important topic for future research. 
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Table 1: Coastal Counties Included in Study 
County Number in  Sample 
Percentage of 
Total 
Survey 
Responses 
(Rate) 
Brazoria, Texas 488 0.080 121 (0.248) 
Brevard, Florida 547 0.090 134 (0.245) 
Brunswick, North Carolina 623 0.103 282 (0.453) 
Dare, North Carolina 1069 0.176 564 (0.528) 
Galveston, Texas 1124 0.185 423 0.376 
Georgetown, South Carolina 493 0.081 193 (0.391) 
Glynn, Georgia 326 0.054 68 (0.209) 
Lee, Florida 455 0.075 129 (0.283) 
Sussex, Delaware 949 0.156 178 (0.188) 
TOTAL (AVERAGE) 6074 1.000 0.344 
 
Table 2: Insurance, Parcel, and Structure Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition N Mean Std Dev 
part*        NFIP participation indicator 6074 0.521 0.569 
flcov        NFIP flood insurance coverage ($100) 5834 716.653 987.352 
flratio NFIP flood insurance coverage / asset value 5773 0.651 1.052 
prem_hi   Marginal flood insurance premium (high) 6072 1.014 1.167 
prem_lo   Marginal flood insurance premium (low) 6072 0.869 1.023 
vzone*        V flood zone indicator 6074 0.505 0.570 
azone*        A flood zone indicator 6074 0.410 0.561 
xzone*        X flood zone indicator 6074 0.085 0.318 
postfirm*     Indicator for structure built after FIRM 6074 0.627 0.551 
subsidy* Indicator for subsidized insurance 6074 0.571 0.564 
elev         Elevation above base flood elevation (BFE) 5882 3.305 15.751 
brkaway*      Indicator for breakaway walls present below structure 6074 0.065 0.280 
obstct*       Indicator for obstructions present below structure 6074 0.184 0.442 
piles*        Indicator for structure on piles 6074 0.689 0.528 
crs          Community Ratings System classification (1998) 6072 8.346 1.475 
er           Erosion rate (feet/year) 6069 2.713 3.720 
ar Accretion rate (feet/year) 6074 0.191 2.068 
geotime      number of years expected before erosion reduces setback to zero 6074 787.924 8751.90 
hur_ret     Hurricane return interval (years) 6074 47.110 61.779 
cbra*         CBRA indicator 6074 0.056 0.263 
distance     Distance from the shore (feet) 6074 318.416 270.492 
ocean*        Oceanfront property indicator 6074 0.421 0.563 
hp           Housing sales price (1000s current $) 2844 187.177 669.815 
asset_val Generated asset value (1000s current $) 6010 143.683 220.613 
yearbuilt    Year structure built 4632 1973.50 19.007 
yearsold     Year parcel sold 3740 1986.74 13.545 
age_at_sale Age of structure when sold 6074 8.207 16.024 
sqft         Square footage 3947 2276.67 3142.42 
vacant* indicator for vacant lot when sold 6074 0.540 0.568 
dcbdm        Distance from central business district (m) 6074 4342.15 5801.51 
* - dummy variable; descriptive statistics are weighted to correct for T-scale sampling 
scheme. 
 
Table 3: Household Descriptive Statistics from Mail Questionnaire 
Variable Definition N Mean Stnd Dev 
incom       Categorical income variable 1711 101.431 105.838 
gradsch*     Graduate school indicator 1798 0.357 0.675 
college*     College graduate indicator 1798 0.436 0.699 
hschool*     High school graduate indicator 1798 0.206 0.570 
parttime*    Part-time employed indicator 1789 0.049 0.305 
retired*     Retired indicator 1789 0.456 0.702 
age         Age of respondent 1775 61.208 17.323 
children    Number of children in the household 1899 0.462 1.738 
pur_wo_ins*  Indicates the individual would have purchased the 
property regardless of whether flood insurance 
was available. 
1715 0.681 0.665 
lapse_ins*  Indicates flood insurance coverage has lapsed in 
the past 
1643 0.111 0.451 
claim*       Indicates previous flood insurance claim has been 
submitted and settled 
1899 0.102 0.437 
mort*        Indicates property is mortgaged 1825 0.390 0.690 
requ*        Indicates mortgage lender required flood 
insurance purchase 
1767 0.154 0.498 
ero_know*    Indicates respondent has seen information on the 
erosion rate at the nearest shore 
1899 0.281 0.649 
armor*       Indicates shoreline armoring employed at the 
nearest shore 
1899 0.192 0.569 
nourish*     Indicates beach replenishment employed at the 
nearest shore 
1899 0.349 0.688 
primary*     Indicates coastal property is primary residence 1814 0.240 0.600 
vacation*    Indicates coastal property is vacation home 1814 0.350 0.671 
pt_rent*     Indicates coastal property is part-time rental 1814 0.307 0.648 
rental*      Indicates coastal property is full-time rental 1814 0.101 0.424 
- Explanations for not holding flood insurance (subset) 
norisk*      Indicates respondent thinks the risk of flooding is 
very low 
292 0.248 1.058 
notreq*      Indicates flood insurance not required 292 0.200 0.980 
too_exp*     Indicates respondent thinks flood insurance is too 
expensive 
292 0.300 1.123 
notavail*    Indicates that flood insurance is perceived as not 
available 
292 0.088 0.696 
* - dummy variable; descriptive statistics are weighted to correct for T-scale sampling 
scheme and over-representation of flood insurance participants. 
 
Table 4: Hedonic Price Regression Model 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
sqft         2.53E-4 2.26E-5 
sqft2        -7.55E-9 1.04E-9 
no_sqft      0.1901 0.0854 
lotsize 1.58E-5 1.96E-6 
lotsize2 -3.29E-11 6.96E-12 
no_lotsize 0.0828* 0.1784 
age_at_sale -0.0076 0.0013 
vacant       -0.4956 0.0506 
ocean        0.4642 0.0375 
distance_CBD -2.354E-5 3.87E-6 
glyn_GA         0.2220* 0.1211 
suss_DE         0.1536* 0.0822 
dare_NC         -0.4872 0.0669 
brev_FL         -0.6178 0.0664 
geor_SC         -0.3683 0.0959 
brun_NC         -0.4929 0.0729 
galv_TX         -0.7462 0.0690 
braz_TX         -1.2398 0.2004 
constant 12.1179 0.0942 
year dummy 
variables YES 
N 2002 
R2 0.5163 
F (p-value) 59.97  (p < 0.0001) 
* - not statistically significant for 5% probability of Type I error; 
excluded county dummy variable is Lee County, FL  
 
       
Table 5: Tobit Coverage Model Results (High Premium) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient
Standard 
Error 
premium -176.059 38.144 -258.441 38.910 -469.956 84.486 -409.299 77.810 
subsidy   -371.130 86.017     
prem×sub   -514.888 98.237     
vzone 406.039 94.721 657.380 85.390 726.830 164.412 462.990 136.495 
xzone -318.916 152.319 -466.992 146.820 -1057.221 260.755 -1095.051 234.928 
asset_val 0.438* 0.312 0.338* 0.251 -0.468* 0.330 1.294 0.503 
hur_ret -32.267 6.823 -21.303 5.864 -38.989 12.918 -5.722* 10.516 
er 27.388 10.619 14.951* 10.308     
ar -19.87* 11.057 -3.537* 13.029     
armor     75.618* 141.400   
nourish     -6.191* 123.251   
ero_know       99.900* 103.359 
vacation       136.080* 121.763 
primary       192.205* 147.666 
mort       839.804 114.619 
income       5.203 0.819 
retired       -69.369* 112.915 
college       -109.195* 109.894 
hschool       -573.076 144.686 
constant 1493.695 195.232 1604.375 165.792 1223.423 325.188 -438.170* 317.304 
sigma 1625 1.014 1499 1.015 1536 1.021 1272 1.020 
state fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES 
Wald (df)  p 967.5  (12) <0.0001 1311  (14) <0.0001 715.5  (14) <0.0001 1332  (18) <0.0001 
N 5766 5766 1668 1446 
* - not statistically significant for 5% probability of Type I error; standard errors are approximated by bootstrap. 
 
Table 6: Tobit Coverage Model Results (Low Premium) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient
Standard 
Error 
premium -486.512 59.022 -411.271 66.355 -1039.705 133.492 -836.280 118.033 
subsidy   -406.932 88.550     
prem×sub   -356.041 107.391     
vzone 515.521 80.538 624.860 81.757 864.865 156.955 569.170 141.316 
xzone -338.715 146.481 -452.635 141.850 -1028.172 244.126 -1059.675 219.983 
asset_val 0.221* 0.281 0.309* 0.237 -0.503* 0.326 1.177 0.483 
hur_ret -25.935 6.295 -21.131 5.895 -26.497 12.699 1.085* 10.502 
er 27.379 10.706 16.302* 10.435     
ar -16.695* 9.866 -4.270* 13.379     
armor     90.030* 137.338   
nourish     -17.978* 117.667   
ero_know       77.701* 101.872 
vacation       126.935* 119.937 
primary       177.737* 146.095 
mort       789.364 112.759 
income       5.073 0.783 
retired       -33.622* 111.855 
college       -79.006* 104.319 
hschool       -548.876 139.403 
constant 1485.499 178.857 1616.584 165.689 1279.922 326.989 -335.004* 316.187 
sigma 1549 1.015 1495 1.014 1474 1.021 1237 1.020 
state fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES 
Wald (df)  p 1268  (12) <0.0001 1344  (14) <0.0001 871.7  (14) <0.0001 1433  (18) <0.0001 
N 5766 5766 1791 1731 
* - not statistically significant for 5% probability of Type I error; standard errors are approximated by bootstrap. 
 
Table 7: Tobit Ratio Model Results (High Premium) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient
Standard 
Error 
premium -0.703 0.027 -0.202 0.031 -0.421 0.033 -0.285 0.030 
subsidy   0.734 0.058     
prem×sub   -1.503 0.053     
vzone 0.771 0.053 0.833 0.052 0.160 0.067 0.077* 0.065 
xzone -0.246 0.076 -0.299 0.069 -0.805 0.093 -0.934 0.089 
hur_ret 0.025 0.004 0.022 0.004 0.002* 0.005 0.019 0.004 
er 0.086 0.006 0.073 0.006     
ar 0.014* 0.009 0.012* 0.009     
armor     -0.290 0.067   
nourish     0.508 0.054   
ero_know       0.103* 0.048 
vacation       0.038* 0.057 
primary       -0.004* 0.069 
mort       0.600 0.051 
income       0.002 0.000 
retired       -0.100* 0.052 
college       -0.079* 0.050 
hschool       -0.529 0.068 
constant -0.198* 0.119 0.031* 0.112 0.622 0.130 0.031* 0.147 
sigma 1.454 0.018 1.328 0.016 1.276 0.023 1.100 0.020 
state fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES 
lnL -9187 -8570 -4271 -3364 
LRT (df)  p 1052 (11) <0.0001 2286 (13) <0.0001 562 (11) <0.0001 774 (17) <0.0001 
N 5766 5766 1668 1446 
* - not statistically significant for 5% probability of Type I error 
 
Table 8: Tobit Ratio Model Results (Low Premium) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient
Standard 
Error 
premium -1.199 0.036 -0.472 0.047 -0.840 0.045 -0.602 0.043 
subsidy   0.570 0.057     
prem×sub   -1.289 0.062     
vzone 0.896 0.051 0.849 0.050 0.281 0.065 0.165 0.063 
xzone -0.270 0.072 -0.298 0.069 -0.794 0.091 -0.911 0.087 
hur_ret 0.032 0.004 0.025 0.004 0.014 0.005 0.025 0.004 
er 0.080 0.006 0.074 0.006     
ar 0.014* 0.009 0.012* 0.009     
armor     -0.256 0.065   
nourish     0.495 0.053   
ero_know       0.086* 0.048 
vacation       0.030* 0.056 
primary       -0.012* 0.068 
mort       0.567 0.050 
income       0.002 0.000 
retired       -0.073* 0.051 
college       -0.056* 0.049 
hschool       -0.509 0.067 
constant 0.040* 0.114 0.085* 0.112 0.567 0.127 0.097* 0.145 
sigma 1.382 0.017 1.326 0.016 1.237 0.022 1.078 0.019 
state fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES 
lnL -8822 -8556 -4157 -3302 
LRT 1782 (11) <0.0001 2314 (13) <0.0001 790 (11) <0.0001 898 (17) <0.0001 
N 5766 5766 1668 1446 
* - not statistically significant for 5% probability of Type I error; standard errors are approximated by bootstrap. 
 
